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JUROR PREJUDICE: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF A CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE
BY NEIL VIDMAR* AND JULIUS MELNITZER**
The authors empirically examine the challenge for cause process in the context
of a murder trial in a rural region in southern Ontario. A survey was under-
taken to assess prejudice in the community. This is the expected indicator of
community prejudice and is compared to prejudice found in potential jurors.
The study also compares the verdicts on each potential juror screened in the
challenge for cause process, as rendered by the triers, defence counsel and a
professional pyschologist observing the procedure. The results of these studies
are presented within.
I. INTRODUCTION
Canadian law recognizes that, in exceptional cases, many of the
veniremen on the panel from which the jury will be drawn, may not be
"indifferent between Her Majesty the Queen and the accused at bar."
The most common cause of such a state of affairs is pre-trial publicity
that has inflamed community sentiments against the accused or dissem-
inated evidence that would not be admissible at trial.' In such cases the
procedural remedies of peremptory challenges, stand asides, or judicial
admonitions to the jurors are considered inadequate, and other reme-
dies are provided: stay of proceedings, 2 change of venue3 and challenge
for cause.
Of these alternatives, challenge for cause is the most controversial
- and the least understood. This article presents an empirical study of
a challenge for cause in a child killing case. The study provides data
bearing upon some of the questions raised about the challenge for
cause. Will veniremen provide candid answers to questions about their
potential prejudices? Can a systematic community survey provide relia-
ble information about the extent of prejudice among a panel of pro-
O Copyright, 1984, Neil Vidmar and Julius Melnitzer.
* Neil Vidmar is a Professor of Psychology and a Professor of Law at the University of
Western Ontario, London, Ontario.
** Julius Melnitzer is a member of the Ontario Bar and senior partner in Cohen and Mel-
nitzer, London, Ontario.
See Arnold and Gold, The Use of a Public Opinion Poll on a Change of Venue Application
(1978-79), 21 Crim. L. Q. 445; Vidmar and Judson, The Use of Social Science Data in a Change
of Venue Application: A Case Study (1981), 59 Can B. Rev. 76, for a discussion of these issues.
2 Canadian Criminal Code s.508.
3 Code s.527.
' Code s.567(l).
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spective jurors? Are the lay triers, entrusted under Canadian law to
decide whether or not a venireman is impartial, competent assessors of
prejudice? Is a trial judge's address to the full panel of veniremen re-
garding the need for prejudiced persons to identify themselves a viable
alternative to the challenge for cause?
A. The Challenge for Cause
The Criminal Code provides that "[a] prosecutor or an accused is
entitled to any number of challenges on the ground that . . . a juror is
not indifferent between the Queen and the accused." The trial judge
has the authority to determine whether the challenge shall be allowed.
If it is, two members from the venire panel are sworn to serve as triers
of the person to be challenged. That person is put under oath and ques-
tioned by the challenging party. After hearing the testimony, the triers
are ordered to reach a verdict as to whether the challenged person is
impartial or not. If the verdict is "not impartial," the prospective juror
is excused; if the verdict is "impartial" the Crown or the accused may
still exercise a peremptory challenge, or, in the Crown's case, a stand
aside.
In the United States, as is fairly well known, there is a right to
challenge each juror on the panel in almost all criminal and civil cases.6
Neither the prosecution nor the accused has to justify the challenge.
The questioning may be lengthy and cover a wide range of topics, in-
cluding the juror's personal attitudes, beliefs, the newspapers he or she
reads, and so forth. Many American jurisdictions use the challenge,
called the voir dire, as standard procedure in almost every trial. In
Canada, challenges for cause are the exception rather than the rule. In
discussions with judges and criminal lawyers across Canada, we have
found that many of these informants cannot recall an instance where a
challenge for cause took place in their jurisdiction. Conversely, chal-
lenges for cause are allowed with some frequency in Toronto and ad-
joining jurisdictions, particularly when the case involves ethnic or racial
minorities.
5 Code s.567(l)(b). Some changes in the challenge for cause have been proposed by the Law
Reform Commission of Canada; see The Jury In Criminal Trials, Working Paper 27 (1980).
0 See Hans and Vidmar, "Jury Selection," in Kerr and Bray, eds., The Psychology of the
Courtroom (1982). In some jurisdictions, prospective jurors are required to fill out a lengthy per-
sonal background questionnaire prior to coming to court. This information is used by counsel as a
basis on which to begin examination.
7 In recent years, especially in federal courts, the judiciary has attempted to drastically cur-
tail the scope of allowable questions, and many judges have begun to conduct the questioning
rather than allow prosecution and defence counsel to do it.
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R. v. Ilubbert8 is the leading case: the Ontario Court of Appeal
asserted that challenge for cause should be evaluated in the context of
modern times and that the procedure has a role to play in the criminal
justice process.9 For example, the Court recognized that the mass me-
dia may disseminate prejudicial information that may justify a chal-
lenge.' 0 On the other hand, the Court expressed concern that Canadian
procedures should not develop along American lines: in Canada, there
is an initial presumption that a juror "will perform his duties in accor-
dance with his oath,"" and furthermore, the "[c]hallenge for cause is
not for the purpose of finding out what kind of juror the person is likely
to be - his personality, beliefs, prejudices, likes or dislikes. 1 2 It also
"must never be used by counsel as a means of indoctrinating the jury
panel to the proposed defence or otherwise attempting to influence the
result of the eventual trial."'13 A principle was enunciated that the trial
judge "has wide discretion and must be firmly in control of the chal-
lenge process"' 4; also, the judge should ensure that the questioning of
jurors should be "relevant", "succinct" and "fair".' 5 In essence, Hub-
bert ultimately gave discretion to the trial judge to decide when chal-
lenge for cause should be allowed and the scope of the questions that
may be put to jurors.
As has already been noted, challenge for cause is a rarely used
procedural device, despite Hubbert's potential. Few lawyers or judges
have had any experience with it. Some express doubts as to its utility.
Others just do not understand its intended function in the criminal jus-
tice process. Yet, there is a growing awareness that Canadian society is
marked by racism and other prejudices that might jeopardize the right
of an accused to a fair trial.' 6 There is also a growing awareness that
the mass media often create a climate that prejudices large segments of
whole communities against an accused.'7 Challenge for cause may,
a (1975), 31 C.R.N.S. 27, 11 O.R. (2d) 464. This decision reviews other Canadian cases,
including R. v. Makow (1975), 28 C.R.N.S. 87, (1974), 20 C.C.C. 513.
Hubbert, id. at 289 (C.R.N.S.).
10 Id. at 291.
n Id. at 289.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 290.
14 Id. at 291.
' Id. at 290-91.
16 See e.g., Strauss, "Increase in Anti-Semitism Reported by McMurtry," The Globe and
Mail (Toronto), Oct. 22, 1983 at A-I; "Canada's Spent 20 Years Battling Hate Literature," The
Toronto Star, Oct. 13, 1983 at A-4; "Canadians Must Act Together to Stem Racism," The
London Free Press, Oct. 19, 1983 at A-5.
17 See e.g., Lowman, "Media Should Police Themselves in Court Coverage, Council
1984]
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therefore, be a useful tool in helping to rectify the condition of wide-
spread pre-trial prejudice. It is important that we begin to understand
its parameters.
B. Overview of the Study
Before considering some of the issues surrounding challenge for
cause, it will be helpful to provide a brief overview of the case study
from which our empirical data were drawn. The case involved a child
murder in a predominantly rural community. Both the mother and fa-
ther were charged with second degree murder. Defence counsel had
reason to believe that there was substantial pre-trial prejudice against
the defendants in the community. A telephone survey was undertaken,
and it confirmed defence counsel's fears. The survey evidence was
presented to the presiding trial judge. Largely on the basis of this sur-
vey evidence,18 the judge allowed a challenge for cause. Up to fifteen
questions were put to each juror. Before the challenge process began,
the judge addressed the full panel of 150 jurors and requested that any
persons come forward who had a connection to the case or who might
otherwise be prejudiced. During these proceedings, a social psychologist
sitting in the public gallery took extensive notes on the challenge pro-
cess, and subsequently made his own decision about the impartiality of
each prospective juror before the triers rendered their verdict. Thus, it
was possible to compare trier verdicts with the psychologist's judgment.
It was also possible to compare defence counsel's19 agreement with the
triers, and with the psychologist.
C. Some Empirical Issues Involved in the Challenge for Cause
As noted above, a number of issues have been raised regarding the
challenge for cause. Some of these issues are essentially normative
ones, such as whether Canadian legal procedure should or should not
mimic American procedure; others, however, are empirical ones. This
research is addressed primarily to the latter. There are at least four
such issues and they are interrelated. They will be discussed in the or-
Says,"The Toronto Star, Oct. 15, 1983 at A-7; Lowman, "Don't Publish Suspects' Names Law-
yer Greenspan Urges Media," The Toronto Star, Oct. 14, 1983 at A-5; "Police Assailed Over
Statements on Video Case," The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Oct. 22, 1983 at A-8.
18 Defence counsel also tendered other evidence to bolster the survey findings, namely news-
paper articles and affidavits from legal assistants who had earlier been threatened by unknown
persons, as they were attempting to gather evidence for the case.
19 Each defendant was represented by separate counsel. Throughout the challenge for cause
phase of the trial these counsel acted as a team and made joint decisions. Therefore, in the re-
mainder of this article we will use the term "defence counsel" to refer to these team decisions.
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der in which they are treated in the subsequent data analysis.
The first issue is whether the challenge for cause is likely to have
much utility in encouraging prospective jurors to disclose their attitudes
and feelings about the case. A basic assumption behind challenges on
grounds of prejudice is that prospective jurors will attempt to tell the
truth about their feelings. Some critics assert that this assumption,
upon which all else rests, is naive; jurors will not be candid about their
prejudices. Psychologists have long recognized the tendency for people
to be reluctant to disclose prejudices in the belief others may come to
view them in a negative light.2 0 The challenge is conducted in a public
courtroom presided over by the highly prestigious figure of the judge.
Thus, jurors might feel great pressure to hide any prejudicial feelings
or beliefs and instead indicate that they have open and impartial
minds. Under Hubbert, the scope of the questions put to the jurors is
likely to be restricted, and intensive cross-examination of the answers
to questions appears proscribed. As a consequence, it can be argued
that the challenge for cause will seldom reveal much about the state of
the venireman's mind. We can shed light on these competing perspec-
tives by examining what jurors actually said during the challenge for
cause.
The second issue involves questions about the validity of survey
evidence which may be tendered to help establish the claim that there
is a reasonable probability that substantial community prejudice exists.
Demonstration of such prejudice may be used to argue for a change of
venue, but it may also be used in a motion for a challenge for cause. In
the very recent past, the primary evidence set forth in such motions
was usually documentation of newspaper articles about the case and
perhaps the sworn opinion of some persons purportedly in touch with
the pulse of the community. 21 Such evidence was often rejected on the
grounds that it was unreliable and unsystematic, or that public emo-
tions may have cooled and memories faded in the time interval between
the crime and the trial. 22 Recently, however, better, more reliable evi-
dence on the state of public opinion has been tendered in pre-trial mo-
tions. That evidence has been gathered through the use of scientifically
designed surveys that directly measure the state of public opinion.23
20 Vidmar and Judson, supra note 1; or Crowne and Marlowe, The Approval Motive (1964).
21 Vidmar and Judson, id.
22 For a review of the case law see Vidmar and Judson, The Use of Social Science Data in a
Change of Venue Application (Research Bulletin #488, Dept. of Psych., U. West. Ont., 1979) at
4-9.
2' Supra note 1. Survey evidence was also tendered in the recent "Squarnish Five" trial: see
R. v. Taylor et al., unreported, B.C.S.C., 1983.
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Such evidence is direct rather than indirect. It allows reliable projec-
tions about the whole community and it measures attitudes as they ex-
ist at the present time, thus bringing more accurate evidence to bear on
arguments that emotions have abated and memories faded.24
Much criticism has been directed to the validity of such survey
evidence; in particular, questions have been raised about whether the
conditions under which surveys assess people's opinions are comparable
to conditions in the courtroom.25 After all, survey interviews, whether
obtained over the telephone or face-to-face, are conducted under condi-
tions somewhat dissimilar to the courtroom; for example, in the former
instance the respondent is at home, the interviewer is not a legal au-
thority figure, consent to the interview is voluntary, the respondent is
not under oath, and answers are given under conditions where jury
duty is not imminent. Thus, critics of survey evidence have argued that
respondents' answers are only hypothetical and perhaps frivolous, or
given in the belief that by expressing prejudice they can avoid possible
jury duty.
It is, however, possible to examine the survey validity issue in the
context of the present case. The results of the survey conducted for the
case can be compared to the answers that were given in court under
oath during the challenge for cause. To the degree that the answers
given in the courtroom correspond with those predicted by the survey,
we will be able to draw conclusions about the reliability of the survey
in predicting responses.
A third issue involves the ability of the challenge for cause to de-
termine which potential jurors are not impartial. This is a different
question than that posed by the first issue, namely whether prospective
jurors will give candid replies to the questions that are asked. Even if
jurors do disclose potential biases, will the triers be able to distinguish
between those who are impartial and those who are not?
The challenge procedure is, after all, an unusual process. Unlike
the American challenge procedure, in which the decision about the im-
partiality or non-impartiality of the venireman is placed in the hands of
the trial judge, the Canadian procedure places the decision in the
hands of two lay triers selected from the jury panel.26 Some legal ex-
24 Questions can be constructed to determine not only what people think or feel in a general
sense, but also to speak to the legally relevant issues of impartiality. For example, respondents in
the surveys can be asked to consider the facts of the case as they know them and to indicate
whether or not they believe they can be an impartial juror if the trial judge instructs them it is
their duty to do so. See Vidmar and Judson, supra note I.
25 Vidmar and Judson, id.
26 Id.
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perts would argue that it is too much to expect two laymen to under-
stand the subtleties of prejudice as it might be understood by an exper-
ienced trial judge (or trial lawyers, or a psychologist). The triers,
therefore, will make haphazard decisions that are inconsistent with the
legal goals of the challenge for cause.
Of course, it is impossible to determine whether the triers make
correct ot incorrect decisions with respect to some absolute criterion,
but it is possible in this case to compare the friers' verdicts with two
other criteria. Firstly, their verdicts can be compared with the judg-
ment of the psychologist who sat in the courtroom, who heard the same
evidence as the triers, and who made a judgment about whether each
potential juror was biased or not. Secondly, the triers' verdicts can be
compared with the decisions of the defence team, both of whom are
experienced trial lawyers: that is, how many times did defence counsel
exercise peremptory challenges against veniremen whom the triers had
found to be impartial.? To the degree that the triers' verdicts corre-
spond to these two criteria, inferences about trier competence may be
made.
A fourth issue involves the question of whether an address by the
judge to the jury panel will cause persons with a bias to step forward
and excuse themselves. As noted in Hubbert, before the jury selection
process begins, some trial judges make a practice of inquiring whether
there is anyone on the panel who is closely connected with a party to
the case or a witness, or whether for some other reason they cannot
decide the case impartially. Such jurors are then excused. The Court
observed that such jurors rarely step forward 28 and it seems obvious to
us that most jurors would be reluctant to come forward under such
conditions. Nevertheless, our discussions with judges indicate that
many adhere to the belief that a judicial request to the whole panel will
cause persons who are not impartial to declare their bias.
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of a judge's query to the
jury panel can be obtained in the present study by comparing the num-
ber of persons who came forward to the judge's request and the num-
ber who should have come forward, as determined by jurors' answers in
the challenge for cause, and by other information which defence coun-
sel had concerning some of the prospective jurors.
27 Hubbert, supra note 8, at 293 (C.R.N.S.).
28 Id.
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II. CASE BACKGROUND AND DATA SOURCES
A. Background to the Challenge for Cause Motion in R. v. Iutzi
2
9
In May, 1978 a fourteen-month old male child was found dead in
Thamesford, a village in largely rural Oxford County, Ontario. He had
died of head injuries. Both parents were charged with second degree
murder. Each denied killing the child. The parents had lived in a num-
ber of villages in Oxford County. They both had worked at a series of
odd jobs throughout the county and were frequent hitchhikers on its
highways and roads. Anecdotal evidence suggested that they were
widely known and somewhat "notorious" throughout the county. De-
fence counsel became alarmed about the extent of community prejudice
against the accused when the accused reported threats against them-
selves and when law students working for defence counsel were also
threatened by citizens in the street.
It is also important to note that while the charges against the par-
ents and various pre-trial motions regarding the case had been reported
in the local media, the coverage from these sources was not massive.
Rather, defense counsel suspected that community prejudice resulted
from word-of-mouth rumor. This was plausible as the total population
of Oxford County is only about 90,000 persons, with about 30,000 lo-
cated in the county seat of Woodstock and the rest scattered among
farms and villages. Sociologists have documented the fact that notori-
ous events occurring in rural communities are widely discussed by the
members of that community. They have also shown that these discus-
sions not only transmit information, but convey expectations about how
the community should feel about the event.30
Consequently, defence counsel hired the first author of this article
to conduct a telephone survey of Oxford County to attempt to assess
the degree of community prejudice. A smaller survey was also under-
taken in Middlesex County which abuts Oxford County, but is consid-
erably less rural. Based upon the survey findings, defence counsel ap-
plied for a change of venue on a Supreme Court motion, but for various
reasons, the application was denied. The survey evidence was re-intro-
duced by means of affidavit at the trial itself. At an in-chambers hear-
ing, the presiding judge also refused a change of venue, but allowed a
challenge for cause.
29 Unreported, Ont. S.C., 1979.
30 See McConahay, Mullin and Frederick, The Uses of Social Science in Trials with Politi-
cal and Racial Overtones: The Trial of Joan Little (1977), 41 Law & Contemp. Prob. 205, for a
discussion of this issue in an American community.
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B. The Survey Findings31
The survey consisted of in-depth telephone interviews with respon-
dents in 197 randomly selected households in Oxford County 2 and un-
covered the fact that the Iutzi case had a high recognition level. Sixty-
six percent of the respondents acknowledged familiarity with the case.
For those respondents acknowledging familiarity, the interviewers
asked them to provide some additional details to ascertain whether they
truly had knowledge about the case, or whether instead, they said so to
avoid appearing ignorant or uninformed. This follow-up question pro-
duced some interesting results. Firstly, the term "child abuse" or asso-
ciated terms such as "battering", "neglect" or "mistreatment" were
mentioned in thirty-nine percent of the sample, even though the inter-
view had been carefully constructed to avoid such terms. Secondly, one
in eight persons reported that knowledge of the case was derived from a
source in addition to the mass media. Many personally knew one of the
accused or had heard about the case from someone who did know
them. Some sample responses are as follows:
"They once rented from my family";
"My neighbours know them";
"I know his family in Woodstock, a relative";
"I know a fellow by that name";
"I worked with his sister";
"I know him pretty good";
"They worked for us at one time";
"I saw him today across the street. While I was in the restaurant,
one fellow pointed him out and we talked about him."
These responses would not surprise a rural sociologist - or anyone who
has lived in a small town. They provided indirect evidence that a great
deal of gossip about the case may have been taking place, as personal
knowledge increases interest and is more likely to cause greater discus-
sion and transmission of facts and rumors.
The next part of the interview attempted to uncover the degree to
which people held attitudes that would likely render them incapable of
serving as impartial jurors. One of the questions asked if the respon-
dent could serve as an impartial juror in the Iutzi case if "instructed by
31 This section summarizes the survey findings. A copy of the complete report of the survey
can be obtained from Neil Vidmar.
82 Ninety-four interviews were also obtained from adjoining Middlesex County and 50 were
undertaken in Toronto. The levels of knowledge and prejudice in these two samples were much
lower than those obtained in Oxford County and those data served as a standard against which
the Oxford data could be compared. These other data are, however, not directly germane to the
thesis of this article and will henceforth be ignored.
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the presiding judge to put all preconceived views aside and decide the
defendants' case solely on the evidence brought before you . . ." Fifty
percent said no, or indicated uncertainty. Questions asking the respon-
dents to give their spontaneous views on the case were even more re-
vealing. These responses uncovered a great deal of community infor-
mation and misinformation about the case, much of which was
inadmissible at trial. Some respondents stated that the mother had a
psychiatric history, that Children's Aid had been involved prior to the
death, that an elder daughter had been "taken away" by Children's
Aid, and that the mother and father had each accused the other of the
death. Some knew where the victim's body was found and its condition.
Other comments revealed allegations of the accuseds' alcoholism, their
welfare status and many debts, of killing the child for insurance money,
of malnourishing him, of putting him in a washing machine, of the
mother barricading herself in a house, of "two children [previously]
being taken away by Children's Aid," and of the trial already having
been held and the parents convicted. A number of respondents sponta-
neously expressed the belief that the accused could not get a fair trial
in Oxford County; many expressly made comments similar to one per-
son who said that they were "definitely guilty but I'd give them the
courtesy of hearing both sides."
One additional question was particularly revealing: it asked
whether the respondent was inclined to think that "both the father and
mother are equally guilty, that the mother is probably more guilty than
the father, or that the father is probably more guilty than the mother?"
Defence counsel had asked, almost as an afterthought, that this ques-
tion be added to the survey interview on the grounds that it might be
helpful later in formulating arguments to the jury about their responsi-
bility to acquit both accused if it could not be determined which parent
had killed the child.33 Unexpectedly, it uncovered the fact that many
respondents held a notion of strict criminal negligence; that is, many
spontaneously said that in their opinion a mother was absolutely re-
sponsible for the welfare of her child and she must be considered re-
sponsible even if she did not actually kill the child. Women were more
likely to hold this view than men, but substantial numbers of both sexes
expressed the belief.
One other finding from the research should be noted. In many of
the interviews, there was some indication that people knew more about
the case than they were willing to reveal to the interviewer. They re-
11 R. v. Schell and Paquette (1977), 33 C.C.C. (2d) 422.
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sponded co-operatively at the beginning of the interview, but as the
questions began to focus on the specifics of the Iutzi case, they became
evasive or actually terminated the interview. Consider some examples:
"It was a child that was abused; no, I don't know anything about
this at all; if this is about the thing coming up in court I don't
want to be involved at all." (Interview terminated.)
"I know nothing; nothing; mistreat children." (Interview
terminated.)
"Child beating." (Respondent says she knows more but would not
talk about it.)
As a consequence of the high number of such responses, the research
psychologist undertook nine additional face-to-face interviews in the
county. The purpose was simply to obtain information about the eva-
siveness hypothesis. The technique used was a standard one employed
by social psychologists in situations where evasiveness is suspected: the
regular interview was administered to the respondent; then, the inter-
viewer put the questionnaire away as if the interview had been termi-
nated and engaged the respondent in an informal discussion about the
topic. Thinking that the interview was over, the respondent frequently
relaxed and gave additional information that had been withheld. The
technique provided some indication that evasiveness may have taken
place. For example, during the formal interview, one woman professed
only meagre knowledge of the case, no knowledge of the accused, and
that she had not discussed the case with anyone. In the informal discus-
sion, however, she revealed that she had gone through school with one
of the accused persons, she knew many of the case details, and just two
days previously, she and her husband had had a lengthy discussion of
the case with neighbours. These additional interviews suggested that
the survey findings may have actually underestimated the degree of
community knowledge and prejudice.
C. The Challenge for Cause
The presiding judge consented to defence counsel's request for a
challenge for cause; the request was not opposed by the Crown. While
the full jury panel was still seated in the courtroom, the judge re-
quested that any persons come forward who had a relationship with
any of the parties to the case or who could not, on other grounds, be
impartial. Four persons did so, as will be described subsequently. The
panel was then ushered out of the courtroom to a waiting room. The
challenge process then began.
Since many readers may not be familiar with the challenge proce-
1984]
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dure, it is worthwhile to describe it in some detail. Two veniremen were
randomly selected from the panel, seated in the jury box, and sworn as
triers. The first prospective juror was called to the witness box and
sworn. Next, defence counsel asked the juror a series of questions about
the case (discussed in more detail below). The Crown was allowed to
ask clarifying questions. Defence counsel and the Crown were then al-
lowed to make a brief submission to the triers regarding whether the
testimony showed that the venireman was impartial or partial. Finally,
the judge charged the two triers to deliberate on the venireman's testi-
mony and render a verdict on whether the venireman was indifferent
between the Queen and the accused. If the venireman was found to be
impartial, and defence counsel and the Crown were content with the
verdict (that is, a peremptory challenge was not exercised), the person
was sworn as a juror, and the judge excused the first trier from further
service. The next venireman was called, and the challenge process was
repeated. The two triers in this instance were the remaining original
trier and the first juror. (The jury selection process under a challenge
for cause involves a form of "round robin" procedure whereby the ju-
rors form successive two-person mini-juries to render verdicts on the
challenge.) A second venireman was found to be impartial and seated
as the second juror. The judge excused the remaining original trier, and
the two sworn jurors served as triers until a third juror was chosen. The
second and third jurors then served as triers until a fourth venireman
was found to be impartial, whereupon the third and fourth jurors
served as triers until a fifth was chosen. This procedure was repeated
until twelve jurors were seated. In the particular case at hand, those
jurors who were sworn in but no longer served as triers stayed seated in
the jury box, and observed challenges to remaining jurors.3 4 It should
also be noted that the two triers on each challenge for cause did not
leave the jury box, but rather remained seated and deliberated their
verdicts in view of the whole court, though in tones that were not audi-
ble to observers.35 Despite the complex sequence of steps involved, the
time between calling a prospective venireman to the witness box and
the verdict averaged about twenty minutes for each challenge.
4 One possible consequence of having the jurors continue to observe the challenge process is
that the exposure to a wide range of persons with different opinions, in addition to the defence
counsel's arguments about what it means to be impartial, may serve to influence their decisions on
impartiality and sensitize them about their duty as jurors.
11 In a recent trial in Vancouver when a challenge for cause took place, the triers retired to
the jury room for their deliberations. This has the advantage of allowing the triers to deliberate
more freely and openly, but the disadvantage of consuming more court time; see Taylor, supra
note 23.
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Defence counsel were allowed to ask up to fifteen questions of each
potential juror. These had been screened by the judge beforehand, and
throughout the challenge process, he allowed only minor deviations
from the set of questions. The questions can be grouped into five cate-
gories.36 The first category inquired about the juror's knowledge of the
case. The second category involved questions about whether the juror
had expressed opinions about the case or had some connection with the
accused. The third category questioned whether the juror knew any of
the witnesses in the case and whether this fact would prevent an objec-
tive evaluation of the testimony. The fourth category of questions was
directed to the issue of strict parental responsibility uncovered in the
survey: jurors were asked whether either of the defendants must be
considered criminally responsible simply on the grounds that the child
was killed. The fifth category of questions concerned preconceived no-
tions of guilt and related to the juror's ability to set aside any precon-
ceptions and decide the case solely on the evidence.
It is important to note several additional facts about the challenge
process. The Crown attorney asked few questions throughout, though
on several occasions he did make a submission to the triers that the
31 The exact questions put to the prospective jurors are as follows:
Knowledge
(I) Are you familiar with the lutzi case; that is, had you heard of it before today?
(2) What have you heard about the case?
(3) Where did you obtain that information?
(4) Have you discussed the case with anyone?
Opinion or Connection to the Iutzis
(5) Have you ever expressed an opinion about the Iutzi's guilt or innocence to anyone?
(6) Do you know either the Iutzis or anyone that is a relative of one of the accused or is in any
way connected to them?
(7) Does anything you know or might have learned about the Iutzis or the case cause you to hold
an opinion about their guilt or innocence?
Witnesses
(8) Do you know any of the witnesses in this case? Whom? (Veniremen were shown a list of
witnesses.)
(9) Would the fact that you know this witness make it difficult for you to reject or disbelieve his
(her) evidence?
Preconceived Notions of Responsibility for Child's Welfare
(10) The charge against the Iutzis is that they are responsible for the death of their fourteen-
month old child. Do you believe that a mother or father or both must be held criminally responsi-
ble for the death of their child?
(1i) Do you have any children?
(12) Does the fact that this case involves the death of a young child prevent you from giving the
lutzis an impartial hearing?
Preconceived Notions of Guilt
(13) Does the fact that the accused have been arrested and charged by the police cause you to
believe that they must be guilty or they would not be on trial here today?
(14) Can you weigh the evidence in an impartial manner by setting aside any preconceptions you
have told us about before deciding whether either of the accused or both are guilty or not?
(15) Are you willing, as the law requires, to consider the accused innocent unless the evidence
presented at trial convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that one or both of them are guilty?
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evidence would indicate the impartiality of the venireman. The Crown
and defence counsel had agreed ahead of time that the Crown would
exercise the right to "stand aside" certain veniremen if they were
called. In a number of instances, defence counsel had information that
certain potential jurors had publicly expressed the belief that the defen-
dants were guilty and that they would vote guilty if picked to serve on
the jury.
A total of seventy-five veniremen were called before a jury was
chosen. The process of jury selection lasted one and one-half days. Not
all jurors were challenged for cause. In twenty instances the Crown
exercised its stand aside option. In five instances defence counsel exer-
cised peremptory challenges. Thus, in the end, only fifty of the seventy-
five veniremen called were actually challenged for cause. Of this num-
ber not all were actually tried by the triers. The defence peremptorily
challenged a venireman in six instances during the questioning process,
when it became apparent that the potential juror was biased37 ; in an-
other six instances defence counsel withdrew the challenge and ac-
cepted the juror when impartiality became apparent.38 One venireman
called was quite deaf, whereupon the Crown stood him aside. In the
result, only thirty-seven of the fifty challenged persons went through
the entire challenge process and were tried.
D. Psychological Ratings
The psychologist took no part in the challenge process. He sat in
the public gallery, listened to the testimony, and took notes. While the
triers were reaching a verdict he made his own decision about the po-
tential juror. The decision was simply whether in his professional opin-
ion, the person was likely to be an impartial juror.
17 The reasons for this action were tactical. These peremptory challenges were exercised only
after a number of jurors had been accepted. Defence counsel had utilized only a few of its twenty-
four peremptories and could, therefore, afford to waste some of them. The trial judge appeared to
be growing restless and impatient. This was a way of indicating to him that defence counsel were
acting fairly and not attempting to abuse their challenge for cause privileges.
18 These decisions too were based upon tactical considerations similar to those described, Id.
If defence counsel wanted the juror, withdrawing the challenge saved time; it might appease the
judge; it avoided the risk that the triers would find the potential juror not to be impartial.
We note, however, that both the tactics of exercising peremptory challenges and withdrawing
the challenge before the triers reached a verdict, may violate older legal precedent. His Honour
Judge l.A. Vannini, Challenges to a Jury (1973), 23 C.R.N.S. 57 at 64, was of the opinion that
"[i]f made by the accused the challenge cannot be withdrawn by him but must proceed to a
verdict."
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III. RESULTS AND ANSWERS
A. The Candidness of Veniremen Answers
The first issue to consider is whether veniremen will give candid
answers. The results of the replies to the five categories of questions put
to the challenged veniremen are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
Results of Questions to Prospective Jurors
QUESTION NUMBER
CONTENTS PERSONS ASKED RESULTS
Knowledge: 50 27 Admitted Knowledge
Opinion: 50 7 Admitted Expressing
Opinion
Witnesses: 50 11 Admitted Knowing a
Principal Crown
Witness
Responsibility for 47 27 Said They Would Hold
Childa Parents Responsible and
Could Not Put This out
of Mind
12 of 23 Males (52%)
15 of 24 Females (63%)
Preconceived Guiltb 32 7 Indicated Pre-judgment
on Guilt
a 3 were excused before these questions were asked.
b 18 were excused or tried before these questions were asked.
Table 1 shows that twenty-seven of the fifty stated that they had rather
detailed knowledge of the case. Seven of them admitted that they had
expressed an opinion about the case that might render them incapable
of reaching an impartial verdict. Eleven stated that they knew one of
the witnesses who would be called to testify in the case, such as a fam-
ily doctor, an ambulance driver, or a nurse. Twenty-seven persons said
that they would be inclined to hold the parents responsible for the
death of the child, despite whoever had actually caused the death. Fe-
males were somewhat more likely to hold these views than males. Fi-
nally, of thirty-two persons who were asked directly about their precon-
ceptions of guilt, seven indicated that they did not believe that they
could be impartial.
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What was the particular nature of the answers? Some of the es-
sence of the replies would be lost in any written transcript because of
the non-verbal cues, the hesitations and the tone of voice. Nevertheless,
it is possible to select some anecdotes that give the flavor of the replies.
Consider some answers to the question which asked: "The charges
against the Iutzis are that they are responsible for the death of their
fourteen-month old child. Do you believe a mother or father or both
must be held criminally responsible for the death of their child?"
Venireman #8 replied, "Well, parents are responsible; if some-
thing happened to my kids, I'd be responsible."
Venireman #12, after a long pause broke into a nervous smile and
said, "If there was any cruelty mixed in, I'd think it was."
Venireman #41 said, "Yes, I have feelings about it; I think they
are criminally responsible."
One of the questions relating to preconceived notions of guilt asked:
"Does the fact that the accused persons have been arrested and
charged by the police cause you to believe that they must be guilty or
they would not be on trial here today?"
Venireman #10 paused for a long while, then lowered his voice
and replied, "I'd think that there would be a good reason for them
being here."
Venireman #15 was asked the question and did not answer. The
question was repeated, but there was still no answer. Defence
counsel rephrased the question slightly, and the venireman finally
replied, "I think they are probably guilty."
These data speak to the issue of whether some veniremen can be
induced to disclose their feelings and attitudes, even if their answers
may not be the socially desirable ones; that is, they are contrary to the
culturally accepted norm, or belief, that an accused must be considered
innocent until proven guilty.-9 Some veniremen may not have disclosed
their true feelings, but clearly many appear to have provided candid
answers. We can conclude that a substantial number of veniremen dis-
closed attitudes and beliefs that could be considered to be prejudiced.
B. The Validity of the Survey Data
By comparing the survey data with the veniremen answers, as re-
ported in Table 1 and the accompanying text, plus the data on peremp-
39 See Vidmar, "Social Science and Jury Selection," in Law Society of Upper Canada, cd.,
Psychology and the Litigation Process (1976) at 115; Hans and Vidmar, supra note 6.
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tory challenges and stand asides, we can obtain some sense of the valid-
ity of the telephone survey, that is, its ability to uncover community
prejudice. These data are presented in Table 2. It should be noted,
however, that it is not possible to make an exact comparison as the
challenge for cause sometimes asked different questions than were
asked in the survey. Nevertheless, even these approximations are
enlightening.
Table 2
Comparing the Survey with Veniremen Responses
and Crown/Defence Knowledge
Challenged Defence Peremptory Total in Survey
A Veniremen B and Crown Stand Challenge
Responses Asidesa (A + B)
1. General 27 of 50 14 of 21 41 of 75 130 of 197
Knowledge
55% 66%
2. Relation or 15 of 50 3 of 21 18 of 75 25 of 197
Connection
to Iutzi 24% 13%
3. Expressed 7 of 50 14 of 21 21 of 71 62 of 197
Opinion
about Caseb 30% 31%
4. Parents Must 27 of 45 - 27 of 45 99 of 197
be Held
Accountable 60% 50%
5. Pre-conceived 34 of 50 14 of 21 48 of 71 104 of 197
Notions of
Guilt 68% 53%
aFive of the 21 peremptory challenges and stand asides were for reasons other than prior knowl-
edge about the venireman's bias.
bThe survey estimate is derived from combining several questions.
Row one of Ta'ble 2 shows that twenty-seven of fifty potential ju-
rors admitted rather detailed knowledge of the case; in addition four-
teen of the twenty-one persons rejected by the defence or the Crown
were known to have knowledge of the case. Thus, forty-one of seventy-
five, or fifty-five percent, indicated detailed knowledge. The survey had
estimated that sixty-six percent of the community had detailed
knowledge.
Row two shows that while the survey had estimated that thirteen
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percent of the population had some connection to the case, the chal-
lenges and information from defence and Crown counsel indicate that
about twenty-four percent had some connection. The survey did not ask
respondents about personal familiarity with witnesses in the case, only
about the defendants. This is probably the reason for the discrepancy.
Row three shows that the survey made an estimate of the number
of persons who had expressed an opinion about the case to be thirty
percent. This is the same figure as that derived from combining the
answers in the challenge with the lawyers' inside knowledge.
Comparing the survey data against juror responses, vis-A-vis the
belief in parents' accountability for their children, is more difficult. The
survey estimate is based on the question about whether the mother, the
father or both should be held accountable, and the spontaneous com-
ments respondents made to this question. Nevertheless, the researcher
had estimated in his affidavit that "as many as fifty percent" of the
community may have held the "strict responsibility" attitudes and that
this was likely to be more true of females than of males. Although a
different question was asked in the challenge, Row four shows that
sixty percent of the persons asked expressed the strict negligence belief
and that females were more inclined to do so than males.
Row five shows that, whereas the survey had estimated that at
least fifty-three percent of the community could not be impartial jurors,
the calculated estimate of lack of impartiality from the various ehal-
lenge questions and from information held by the defence and Crown
counsel is sixty-eight percent.
It is worth emphasizing again that these comparative data must be
treated very cautiously because of the lack of similarity of the two data
sources. Nevertheless, it is clear that, if anything, the survey appears to
have underestimated the degree of community prejudice. As mentioned
earlier, the affidavit by the research psychologist submitted to the trial
judge indicated that the supplementary sample of face-to-face inter-
views led him to a professional opinion that the telephone survey find-
ings were a conservative estimate of the degree of prejudice in the com-
munity. Therefore, from this case study at least, there is evidence that
a public opinion survey may underestimate rather than overestimate
prejudice.
C. Agreement among Triers, Defence Counsel and Psychologist
An assessment of the decision-making of the triers should begin by
asking what their decisions actually were. Recall from earlier discus-
sion that the triers rendered verdicts on thirty-seven veniremen. In
fourteen of these cases the verdict was that the venireman was impar-
[VOL. 22, No. 3
Juror Prejudice
tial. In twenty-two the verdict was that the venireman was not impar-
tial; in the remaining instance, the triers could not agree on a verdict
and the Crown subsequently stood the juror aside. Ignoring the split
verdict, we can conclude that of the cases where a verdict was ren-
dered, the triers found only thirty-eight percent of the veniremen to be
impartial (fourteen of thirty-six decisions).
Recognizing that the triers made distinctions between the various
veniremen, however, does not tell us much about their competence. Did
they make the right distinctions? Their verdicts need to be compared to
some external standard. One standard is defence counsel's acceptance
or rejection of their verdicts and another is the social psychologist's
agreement with their verdicts. Think of the problem by using the psy-
chologist's decisions as the comparison standard. For each venireman
who was challenged, the triers could render one of two verdicts. Simi-
larly, the psychologist also rendered one of two "verdicts" about the
venireman. For each venireman tried, therefore, there are four possible
outcomes: (a) triers decide impartial and psychologist decides impar-
tial; (b) triers decide impartial but psychologist decides not impartial;
(c) triers decide not impartial but psychologist decides impartial; (d)
triers decide not impartial and psychologist decides not impartial. To
the extent that there is agreement between the triers and the psycholo-
gist, their decisions on the veniremen should be either outcomes (a) or
(d); to the extent that there is disagreement, their decisions will be
reflected as outcomes (b) or (c). The four outcomes reflected by the
two sets of decisions can be portrayed as a two by two table, as demon-
strated in Table 3.
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Firstly, consider the agreement between the triers and defence
counsel. Recall from earlier discussion that in six instances defence
counsel withdrew their challenge after hearing the venireman's answers
to the questions. It seems very likely that the triers would have decided
that these six persons were impartial. 0 Additionally, defence counsel
agreed with the triers in all twenty-two instances where the triers found
the veniremen not to be impartial, that is, defence counsel would have
rejected the venireman. Ignoring the one instance where the triers
could not reach a verdict on the venireman, these figures give us a total
of forty-two cases in which the decisions of the triers can be compared
with the decisions of the defence counsel.
These data are represented in part A of Table 3 which shows both
the raw number of cases in each cell plus the percentages of the forty-
two cases which these numbers represent. The upper left cell shows the
percentage of instances when both defence counsel and triers agreed
that the venireman was impartial (twenty-nine percent) and the lower
right cell shows the percentage of instances when they agreed that the
venireman was not impartial (fifty-two percent). Thus, adding these
two figures together we arrive at the conclusion that the overall agree-
ment rate was eighty-one percent. The eight cases in the lower left
hand corner of the cell are, however, important cases of disagreement.
The triers would have accepted these persons as jurors, but defence
counsel rejected them. Nevertheless, let us first turn to some other
comparisons before we give these eight cases further consideration.
Consider next the agreement between the triers and the psycholo-
gist. After listening to the forty-two veniremen,4' the psychologist de-
cided that fifteen of them, or thirty-six percent, were impartial,
whereas twenty-seven, or sixty-four percent, were not impartial. The
extent to which he agreed with the triers is described in part B of Table
3. It may be seen from the Table that the triers and the psychologist
agreed that fifteen veniremen were impartial and twenty-two were not;
however, there was disagreement over five veniremen, all of whom were
found impartial by the triers, but not by the psychologist. Overall the
agreement rate between the psychologist and triers was eighty-eight
percent.
It is also useful to explore the agreement rate between the two
40 This assumption, of course, is open to debate, but it seems reasonable in light of the other
data to be presented below, namely that the psychologist too would have accepted the jurors and
that the triers had a more lax standard of impartiality than either the defence counsel or the
psychologist.
41 This figure includes the six instances where defence counsel withdrew their challenges as
discussed, supra note 38.
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criteria against which triers' decisions have been compared, namely the
agreement between the defence counsel team and the psychologist. Part
C of Table 3 presents these data.42 Following the same logic as in the
other comparisons, this Table shows that defence counsel and the psy-
chologist agreed that eleven of the forty-two veniremen were acceptable
or impartial jurors and twenty-six were not, for a total agreement rate
of eighty-eight percent (twenty-six percent plus sixty-two percent). It is
important to note that the defence team accepted one venireman that
the psychologist decided was not impartial and rejected four persons
that he decided were impartial. What were the factors behind this disa-
greement? Subsequent comparison of notes by the defence counsel and
psychologist suggests that some of this disagreement was due to differ-
ent decisional criteria. The psychologist's decision was solely about the
person's ability to be an impartial juror, whereas defence counsel had
other considerations. In the case of the one venireman that the defence
team accepted but the psychologist would have rejected, defence coun-
sel conceded that in their estimation she was marginally prejudiced,
but nine other jurors had already been seated. They felt that she would
probably not be a significant person on the jury and would likely con-
form to the majority. Turning to the four veniremen in the upper right
cell of part C of Table 3, the comparison of notes again shows consider-
ations other than impartiality went into three of the four rejections by
defence counsel. They decided that while three of these four persons
probably were impartial, all three held high status occupations that
might give them undue influence on the jury. In the remaining case,
defence counsel simply disagreed with the psychologist, that is, believed
that the person probably was not impartial. Thus, in four of the five
cases defence counsel's decisions were made on grounds other than ju-
ror impartiality, specifically, grounds relating to the person's potential
social influence on the jury.
These latter findings allow us to consider again the disagreement
of defence counsel with the triers regarding those eight veniremen that
the triers found impartial and would have seated as jurors, as discussed
above regarding part A of Table 3. Like those of the psychologist, the
triers' decisions were only supposed to be based upon a consideration of
whether the prospective juror was impartial, not the other considera-
tions which prompted defence counsel's decisions. 3 Thus, those three
42 Here we can expand our sample size to include cases where defence counsel exercised their
peremptory challenges without allowing the triers to render a verdict and also the one venireman
for whom the two triers could not reach a verdict. Thus the final sample size was fifty.
43 This does not mean that other considerations did not enter into the decisions that they
rendered, such as whether they simply liked or disliked the person regardless of his or her imparti-
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veniremen whom the defence considered to be impartial, but who were
rejected on other grounds, can be added as instances of agreement. The
result of adding these three cases to the six trier verdicts with which
the defence was content, and the six cases where we speculate that the
triers would have made a finding of impartiality, yields a total of fifteen
veniremen out of twenty. Thus, the agreement rate between defence
and triers on these crucial instances was fifteen out of twenty, precisely
the same agreement rate as that between the psychologist and the
triers.
In summary, the agreement rate among the three separate deci-
sion-makers - triers, defence counsel and psychologist - can be com-
pared in two ways: agreement regarding all veniremen who were chal-
lenged and agreement regarding just those persons whom the triers
would have seated as jurors. The agreement rate on the former is re-
markably high between all three decision-makers: on average the three
sources agreed about eighty-eight percent of the time. The agreement
rate drops to seventy-five percent when we consider only those venire-
men that the triers would have seated. It appears that the triers utilized
a less stringent standard in deciding what it means to be impartial than
that used by defence counsel and the psychologist. Nevertheless, the
bottom line is that triers rejected many persons who would have been
seated as jurors if the challenges had not taken place. These verdicts
concurred with those of the defence counsel and the psychologist.
D. Effectiveness of a Judicial Query
Finally, we can consider the effectiveness of the judge's request
that biased jurors step forward and identify themselves. As noted ear-
lier, the trial judge made an address to the whole panel requesting that
any person who had a bias or a connection to the case come forward.
Four persons did so. Two had direct ties to the case and two admitted
that they were biased in other ways. The data previously presented
makes it very clear that far more than four persons on the panel were
biased, yet they did not identify themselves at that time. The judge's
request, therefore, was not effective in getting biased persons to come
forward.
Because many judges apparently have faith in the effectiveness of
an address to the whole panel, it is worthwhile to consider some hy-
potheses to explain why the converse is true. Firstly, some members of
ality. However, their task under the law as it was explained to them was to decide only whether
the person was impartial or not impartial. It is at least unlikely that they considered factors such
as who would have influence on the jury.
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the panel did not know who the witnesses would be. They became
aware of the witnesses' identities only after they were seated in the
witness box and shown a copy of the witness list. Secondly, many of
them were apparently not aware of what the judge meant by his ques-
tion about being biased. The nature of bias began to be apparent to
veniremen and triers only after defence counsel put their questions to
the individual veniremen and they thought about their prejudices in
depth. Thirdly, some veniremen may have been aware that they har-
bored bias, but they were hesitant to step forward and appear different
from other panel members. There are strong pressures to remain anon-
ymous in group settings such as those typified by the courtroom.14 Fur-
thermore, an admission of prejudice may be perceived as a confession
of weakness of character, especially when the other panelists remain
seated and give the appearance of not holding biases against the ac-
cused. Fourthly, some members of the panel, who were aware of their
biases, may have wanted to be selected as jurors to ensure the convic-
tion of the defendants. In fact, both defence and Crown counsel pe-
remptorily challenged or stood aside certain persons who, to the knowl-
edge of counsel, had made statements to acquaintances that they
planned to vote for conviction, if chosen as jurors. It is not possible to
determine the extent or degree to which each of these hypotheses ex-
plain the failure of biased persons to step forward.
Possibly in some cases, a judicial request to the panel might be
effective. However, even if it is seldom effective it may not matter too
much in the ordinary, typical criminal case. The Iutzi case, however,
was not ordinary or typical insofar as pre-trial prejudice was con-
cerned. It is clear that, at least in this instance, the request to step
forward was not substantially effective in eliminating biased persons.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This empirical analysis of the challenge for cause in R. v. Iutzi
provides information bearing on a number of issues regarding pre-trial
prejudice. To the extent that we can generalize from a single case
study, four conclusions seem justified. First, some jurors will candidly
reveal their prejudices when they are challenged under oath. Second,
there is evidence that a telephone survey of the community may yield a
reliable estimate of community prejudice regarding a particular case.
Third, there is evidence that triers are reasonably competent in distin-
guishing between veniremen who are and who are not impartial.
44 See Vidmar, supra note 39; Hans and Vidmar, supra note 6.
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Fourth, a judicial address to the total panel requesting biased persons
to come forward is not an effective technique for eliminating prejudiced
persons. From the perspective of modern psychological assessment tech-
niques, the challenge for cause process, as prescribed under Hubbert, is
a rather rough and primitive instrument. It might be compared to a net
that has a substantial number of holes in it. Yet, even with these holes,
the net appears adequate to snare at least many of the persons who are
not indifferent between the Queen and the accused.
The findings also bear upon the normative issue surrounding the
challenge for cause insofar as it served the ends of justice in this partic-
ular case. We can never know, of course, what verdict a jury composed
of unchallenged veniremen would have reached. We do know that after
listening to over six weeks of evidence the jury found the father not
guilty of murder, but found the mother guilty of the lesser included
charge of manslaughter. We do know that three different sets of deci-
sion-makers - the triers, the defence counsel team and the psycholo-
gist - all concluded that a very substantial number of veniremen on
the panel could not have served as impartial jurors. We are left with
the speculation that a jury selected without a challenge might well have
returned a different verdict.
There is also the issue of court efficiency. Some, including the pre-
sent authors, would argue that matters of court efficiency should be
given no consideration in circumstances as important as a murder trial.
On the other hand, many judges, politicians and members of the public
do express concern about the price of justice. These persons may assert
that challenge for cause is too time consuming and costly. Fears are
expressed that jury selection could take weeks. In the present instance,
a rather extensive challenge consumed less than one and one-half days
of court time, and it was a small percentage of the total time devoted to
the trial. Critics may still consider one and one-half days to be extrava-
gant, but at least there is a figure upon which normative judgments can
be argued.
The present research, with the various limitations that we have
noted, is far from a definitive answer to the issues involved in the chal-
lenge for cause. But such data is preferable to opinions proffered with-
out empirical facts. At the very least, this research note shows the di-
rection in which empirical issues regarding the challenge for cause -
and other remedies for pre-trial prejudice - may be assessed.
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